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The International Criminal Court's Lubanga decision has been hailed
as a landmark ruling heralding an end to impunity for those who recruit
and employ children in armed conflict and a pivotal victory for the
protection of children. Overlooked amidst this self-congratulation is that
the ICC incorrectly applied the law governing civilian participation in
hostilities which perversely places child soldiers at greater risk of being
attacked. The Court created a false distinction between active and direct
participation in hostilities. Expanding the kinds and types of behaviors
that constitute children actively participating in hostilities expanded
Lubanga's liability. But under the law of armed conflict active and direct
refer to the some quantum of participation. And when a civilian,
including a child soldier, directly participates in hostilities, they lose a
pivotal protection - the protection from being made the lawful object of
attack. The ICC's first verdict confuses an already opaque area of the
law. Worse, the ICC now provides the international legal imprimatur for
the permissible targeting of child soldiers under a wider range of
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1. INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 2012, the International Criminal Court announced its first
ever verdict, finding a Congolese rebel militia leader guilty of conscripting and
enlisting child soldiers under the age of fifteen into armed groups and using
them to actively participate in hostilities,' which are war crimes under the
Rome Statute.2 The Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the
Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo focused on offenses
committed in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between
2002 and 2003. This case marked a series of firsts for the International Criminal
Court (ICC); the trial flowed from the court's first formal investigation,3 Lubanga
1 The term child soldiers, while used in this article, is often, and incorrectly, conceptualized as
the barefoot boy carrying an AK-47 assault rifle half his size; See generally MARK DRUMBL,
REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2011) (discussing how, contrary to
popular conceptions, there are almost as many girl child soldiers as boy child soldiers, how
child soldiers perform more support type functions than carry and use weapons, and how
there are more child soldiers in south Asia then Africa). The more contemporary, albeit wordy,
term is children associated with armed forces and armed groups. UNICEF, The Paris Principles.
Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 1 2.1
(Feb. 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/465198442.html, see generally The
Secretary-General, Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General: Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996).
2 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment (Mar. 14 2012),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl379838.pdf [hereinafter Lubanga Judgment]. The
court subsequently sentenced Lubanga to fourteen years in prison. Marlisle Simons,
International Criminal Court Issues First Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/international-criminal-court-issues-first-
sentence.html.
Lubanga Case, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013). The conflicts in the DRC are sometimes referred to as the First and
Second Congo Wars or as Africa's first world war. The conflicts, however styled, have claimed
the lives of over five million people and displaced several million more. The conflicts have
involved at least 8 African countries and more than twenty armed groups with varying, and
alternating, allegiances and backing; See generally Q&A: DR Congo Conflict, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11108589 (last updated Nov. 20, 2012). The Second
Congo War technically ended in 2003, but the November 2012 fighting in and around the
eastern DRC city of Goma stems in large part from unresolved issues in the earlier conflicts. See
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was the first person the ICC detained,4 and Lubanga's trial also marked the first
time in international criminal justice that victims were formally recognized as
participants in the proceedings and not just as prosecution witnesses.5
However, the proceedings were not without controversy. The use of
confidentiality agreements, the role of third party intermediaries in witness
interviews, and the disclosure (or lack) of exculpatory evidence to the defense
6are examples of controversial practices adopted by the court. As a result, the
trial chamber directed Lubanga's release on two different occasions, of which
both decisions were appealed and eventually reversed.7  Victims, availing
themselves of their role as participants, unsuccessfully petitioned the court to
supplement the charges against Lubanga to include sexual slavery and
cruel/inhumane treatment, and then unsuccessfully appealed the denial.
The Lubanga decision has been hailed as a landmark ruling which, according
to the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children
and Armed Conflict, heralds an end to impunity for Lubanga and "those who
recruit and use children in armed conflict." 9 The head of the United Nations
4 Press Release, Internationi Criminal Court, First Arrest for the International Criminal Court
(Mar. 17 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2006/Pages/first%20arrest%
20for%20the%20international%20criminal%20court.aspx.
s Along with that recognition, under the Rome Statute, victims are allowed to present their
views and observations to the court. Again, for the first time in international criminal justice,
the ICC trial chamber in Lubanga ordered reparations for the victims; See also Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decisions Establishing the Principles and
Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl447971.pdf, see generally Victims and Witnesses, International
Criminal Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/enmenus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/victims/Pages/victims%20and%20witn
esses.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); Thomas Lubanga Trial: Timeline of Victims'
Engagement, REDRESS, http://www.redress.org/downloads/ThomasLubangavictimstimeline-
140312.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); Lubanga Case - Q & A on ICC Landmark Decision on
Reparations for Victims, REDRESS (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.vrwg.org/home/home/post/36-
lubanga-case---q--a-on-icc-landmark-decision-on-reparations-for-victims#_ftnl.
See Lubanga Case, supra note 3. For example, there were 54 status conferences before the
trial started. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 10. The presentation of evidence took place
from January 2009 until May 2011. Id. at ] 11.
7See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Prosecutions appeal
against trial chambers I's oral decision to release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Urgent Application
for Suspensive Effect (July 2, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc909257.pdf.
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Joint Application of the Legal
Representatives of the Victims for the Implementation of the Procedure under Regulation 55
of the Regulations of the Court (May 22, 2009).
In landmark ruling, ICC finds Congolese warlord guilty of recruiting child soldiers, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.un .org/apps/news/story.asp?Newsl D=41537&Cr= ICC&Crl#. UNGGgYIetK.
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Childrens Fund called the decision a "pivotal victory for the protection of
children in conflict."'10 Overlooked amidst this self-congratulation is that the
ICC's first case incorrectly applied the law governing civilian participation in
hostilities. Worse, the Lubanga Court's overbroad interpretation of the criminal
prohibition against employing children in hostilities leads to child soldiers
losing, not gaining, protection under the law of armed conflict.
The criminal prohibition against employing children in hostilities is
undoubtedly intended to protect child soldiers. Expanding the kinds and types
of behaviors that constitute children actively participating in hostilities
expanded the scope of Lubanga's liability. But, while there is a protective
aspect in that expansion, there is a retributive one as well, which is not directed
at the Lubangas of the world. When a civilian, including a child, directly
participates in hostilities, they lose a pivotal legal protection-the protection
from being made the object of attack.
If the question of what constitutes direct participation is asked from a
retributive perspective, as in when someone may be targeted, the range of
qualifying activities is narrowly subscribed. While the perspective, retributive
or protective, shapes the scope of the attendant answer, there is an
unavoidable duality. This article explores the perverse mutualism of
participation in hostilities, which the Lubanga court seemingly ignored.
The first section will review the conflicts in eastern DRC in which Lubanga
utilized child soldiers. The next section discusses the lack on international
consensus on the age of majority as a backdrop for the difficulties the ICC
faced. From there, the article details the types of activities the ICC found
UPC/FPLC child soldiers engaged in and the parties' arguments as whether
those activities constituted active participation in hostilities. The focus of the
article then illustrates how the court incorrectly parsed active from direct
participation. The article concludes that the Lubanga Court unfortunately
further confused an already opaque area of the law. In the process, the ICC
provides the international legal imprimatur for the permissible targeting of
child soldiers under a wider range of circumstances then previously recognized.
II. BACKGROUND
Against the backdrop of "a series of political upheavals and rapidly shifting
military alliances" in northeastern DRC that created a humanitarian situation
the United Nations called "close to catastrophic", Lubanga co-founded the
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) on September 15, 2000.11 The UPC then
10 Id.
1Lubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, at S] 79-81 (noting that Lubanga served as the
"President" of the UPC).
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became a rebel movement that vied for military control of the Ituri district, a
mineral rich region of the DRC bordering Uganda.' 2 To enable and foster that
control, Lubanga mandated that every family in the area "contribute to the war
effort by providing a cow, money, or a child" to the UPC.' 3
The UPC took over the city of Bunia, the capital of the Ituri district, on
August 9, 2002.14 This proved to be a turning point in the conflict because the
"nature of the violence against the civilian population reached unprecedented
extremes."' 5 To better facilitate this violence, Lubanga created the military
wing of the UPC, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC),
for which he served as commander in chief.'6 With that:
[t]he need for a more substantial army led to increased recruitment of young
people-regardless of age-by targeting schools and the general public, and
through coercive campaigns in the villages. . . . this inevitably led to the
conscription, enlistment and use of children below 15 years of age ....
Furthermore, no attempt was made to check the ages of the recruits.' 7
Around this time, Lubanga claimed to have an army of some 15,000
troops.'8  But the UPC/FPLC has been described as an army of children.19
Estimates are that roughly 40% of the UPC were under the age of eighteen,
12 Id. at S] 22, 67, 81. The Ituri is "fertile and rich in resources such as gold, diamonds, oil,
[and] timber." Id. at ] 71. The Ituri also has one of the world's largest concentrations of coltan,
a mineral used in cell phone and laptop batteries. See Q&A: DR Congo Conflict, supra note 3.
Resources form much of the basis for conflict in the DRC, ethnic tensions, exacerbated by
colonial rule and arbitrarily set borders, the rest. The DRC has close to 450 different ethnic
groups, with 18 different groups in the Ituri alone. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, ] 73.
13 DRC: MONUC Denounces Recruitment of Child Soldiers by Lubango's UPC/RP, I RIN
HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND ANALYSIS AFRICA (Feb. 7 2003),
http://ablefromwww.irinnews.org/Report/41492/DRC-MONUC-denounces-recruitment-of-
child-soldiers-by-Lubanga-s-UPC-RP [hereinafter MONUC].
14 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 1084. The DRC national government formed the Ituri
Interim Administration in 2003, which recognized Bunia as its capital.
1s Id. at 543.
16 Id. at S] 27-28.
17 Id. at ] 26, 29. Lubanga orchestrated campaigns to recruit soldiers of all ages, including
those below the age of 15 years, who were trained and sent to the front line.
1s Human Rights Watch, Ituri: "Covered in Blood," Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern
DR Congo 46 (July 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch], available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703full.pdf.
19 Id. at 46-47. Lubanga at one point claimed that the United Nations 'never notified us that
we should not recruit children." MONUC, supra note 13. In an interview with Human Rights
Watch, Lubanga stated that "the UPC does not have many children under eighteen....we
sometimes find children. We don't force anyone. It is just those who come freely." Human
Rights Watch, supra note 18, at 46-47. Another UPC commander stated that the "underage
children were all orphans and that the UPC was looking after them." Id.
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with some as young as seven-years-old. 20 Observers reported UPC/FPL utilized
child soldiers still wearing school uniforms, forcibly "recruiting" the entire 5th
grade of a school in one town and surrounding a neighborhood and abducting
the children in another. 2 1
From September 2002 until August 2003, Lubanga directed his forces to
complete the conquest of the Ituri. 22  Under Lubanga's leadership, the UPC
massacred, tortured, mutilated and raped civilians in the northeast DRC. 23 In
April of 2003, Uganda withdrew its 7000 troops stationed in the Ituri, leaving a
little more than 800 UN peacekeepers from Uruguay to protect the region. 24
While the presence of the Ugandan soldiers in the DRC was itself controversial,
their absence created a power vacuum which the UPC/FPLC and other armed
groups were quick to fill. The resulting violence in and around Bunia was
nightmarish, at times male child soldiers, wearing wigs and ball gowns, hacked
civilians to death with machetes and then cut out and ate their hearts. 25
The violence was so extreme that on May 30, 2003, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 1484, authorizing the deployment of an
emergency force to Bunia. 26 France led the force, which began deploying to
27Bunia in mid June 2003. France's efforts, called "Operation Artemis",
succeeded in stabilizing Bunia and facilitated the transition to a more robust
United Nations force by the end of the summer. 28
Lubanga's hold on the region lessened considerably, and he left eastern
DRC for the capital, Kinshasa. There he purportedly awaited promotion to
General in the FARDC, the Congolese Army, a reward promised to militia
leaders who disarmed their groups (which the UPC/FPLC hadn't done) and
incorporated them into the FARDC, but the UPC continued fighting in the
29Ituri. In late February 2005, Lubanga's forces were involved in the murder of
20 Id. at 1
21 Id.
22 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 67. By the fall of 2002, the UPC/FPLC was in sufficient
control that Lubanga wrote the government of the DRC seeking national recognition and
autonomy for the Ituri District. Id. at ] 25.
23 Human Rights Watch, supra note 18.
24 Id. at 52.
25 BRYAN MEALER, ALL THINGS MUST FIGHT To LIVE: STORIES OF WAR AND DELIVERANCE IN THE CONGO
(2008) (explaining that the mystical belief that wearing the gown and wigs either gave the
wearer invulnerability or protected the underlying child soldier in the event of harm).
26 S.C. Res. 1484, ] 3, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1484 (May 30, 2003).
2Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, UNITED NATIONS
LOGISTICS BASE (Oct. 2004), http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Artemis.pdf.
28 See id.
2Press Release, Department of Public Information, Attacks Against UN Personnel Continued
Unabated Throughout 2005, UN Staff Union Says, U.N. Press Release ORG/1457 (May 1, 2006),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/orgl457.doc.htm.
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nine Bangladeshi United Nations troops near the town of Kafe. 30 The ambush
of the peacekeepers was the deadliest single day for the UN in its operations in
the DRC. 3 ' The United Nations Security Council publically condemned the
attack.32 A week later, United Nations forces in northeastern DRC conducted a
combined air and ground assault on the UPC and other militia groups involved
in the ambush, killing over 60. In mid march, 2005, the DRC arrested Lubanga
in Kinshasa for alleged violations of the DRC military criminal code, including
murder, genocide, crimes against humanity and illegal detention. 34
However, in April, 2004, the DRC had requested that the ICC prosecutor
investigate "the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
allegedly committed anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into
force of the Rome Statute, on 1 July 2002.'s In June, 2004, the ICC prosecutor
announced he was opening an investigation of grave crimes allegedly
committed in the DRC.36 In March 2006, the ICC unsealed its indictment of
Lubanga and he was immediately transferred to The Hague. The charges
3o Id. (describing how the UN troops had been protecting a camp of internally displaced
persons from militias, like the UPC, which had been looting belongings from the camp and
forcing its occupants to pay taxes).
31 Id.
32 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Murder of Nine UN peacekeepers
in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Press Release SC/8327/Rev.1* (Feb. 3, 2005),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8327.doc.htm.
U.N. Forces Kill60 Congo Militia, CN N INT'L (Mar. 4 2005),
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/03/02/congo.deaths.
34 Thomas Lubanga and the ICC, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (2008),
http://humansecuritygateway.com/docu ments/ICTJDRCLugandaFactsheet. pdf.
3s Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecution Recieves Referral of the Situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/enmenus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/prosecutor%20r
eceives%20referral%200f%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%2Oof
%20congo.aspx. The DRC's self-referral was one step ahead of the ICC initiating an
investigation under its own authority. In July, 2003, the ICC prosecutor announced he was
"closely follow[ing] the situation in the DRC" after having received communications from a
wide range of individuals and non-government organizations on events in the Ituri District. Id.
By August, 2003, "the Prosecutor informed the Assembly of States Parties that he would be
prepared to seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber to start an investigation under his
proprio motu powers, but that a referral and active support from the DRC would facilitate the
work of the Office of the Prosecutor." Id.
Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en men us/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/Pages/the%20ffice%2
00f%20the%20prosecutor%200f%20the%20international%20crim inal%20cou rt%200pens%20it
s%20first%20investigation.aspx [hereinafter Investigation Press Release].
Democratic Republic of Congo: Situations and Cases, I NT'L CRI M. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en men us/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%2icc%200104/Pages/s
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were confirmed and followed by a trial. In announcing its investigation into
the DRC, the ICC stated that:
[m]illions of civilians have died as a result of conflict in the DRC since the
1990's.... States, international organizations and non-governmental
organizations have reported thousands of deaths by mass murder and
summary execution in the DRC since 2002. The reports allege a pattern of
rape, torture, forced displacement and the illegal use of child soldiers.38
It was Lubanga's recruitment, forcible and otherwise, and use, of child
soldiers, which became the basis of the charges against him. Specifically, the
ICC prosecuted Lubanga on charges that he, as a co-perpetrator, enlisted and
conscripted children under the age of fifteen years into the FPLC and used
them to participate actively in hostilities within the meaning of article
8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute from early September 2002 to 2 June 2003.39
These charges required the prosecutor to prove, among other elements,
that (1) children under the age of fifteen (2) actively participated in hostilities.
III. CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Age of A Child Soldier Under International Law
The Rome Statute's fifteen-year age threshold for criminalizing the
enlistment, conscription, and active use in hostilities is unambiguous. But a
brief survey of the lack of consensus on the age of majority as applied to service
in the military underscores some of the difficulties the Lubanga Court faced.
Additional Protocol I (AP 1) to the Geneva Conventions states a qualified
limitation that "[t]he Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in
order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a
direct part in hostilities" 40 The commentary to that section of AP I makes clear
that the age limitation is aspirational and that child soldiers under the age of 15
ituation%20index.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
38 Investigation Press Release, supra note 38.
39See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Diylo, INT'L CRIM. CT. (Jan. 29, 2007),
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF; Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 8(2)(e)(vii), July, 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (prohibiting "[c]onscripting or
enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them
to participate actively in hostilities," not of an international character).
Lubanga was also charged with violating article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, which deals with
modes of liability, specifically individual criminal responsibility. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 25(3)(a), July, 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/CON F.183/9*.
4Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 77(2), 1125 U.N.T.S.
17512 [hereinafter AP 1].
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were still, reluctantly, if not accepted then expected.
Participation of children and adolescents in combat is an inhumane practice
and the ICRC considered that it should come to an end because it entails mortal
danger for the children themselves. Nevertheless, the ICRC proposals
encountered some opposition, as on this point governments did not wish to
undertake unconditional obligations. In fact, the ICRC had suggested that the
Parties to the conflict should "take all necessary measures", which became in
the final text, "take all feasible measures." Although the obligation to refrain
from recruiting children under the age of fifteen remains, the one of refusing
their voluntary enrolment is no longer explicitly mentioned. In fact, according
to the Rapporteur, Committee III noted that sometimes, especially in occupied
territories and in wars of national liberation, it would not be realistic to totally
prohibit voluntary participation of children under fifteen.4 1
Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions speaks more
definitively, that "children who have no attained the age of fifteen years shall
neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in
hostilities." 42
The 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child replicates AP I, requiring
feasible measures to prevent persons under the age of fifteen from
participating in hostilities.43 The 2002 subsequent Optional Protocol, which
specifically addressed the involvement of children in armed conflict, while using
the same feasible measures language, increased the age persons under
eighteen.44
Under the 1997 Cape Town Principles, the term child soldier means any
person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks,
porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely
as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced
41 AP I, supra note 42, at cmt. 3183-84.
42 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4(3)(c), 1125 U.N.T.S.
17513 [hereinafter AP ll].
43 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38(2), Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 ("States
Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age
of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities."), see also Jo de Berry, Child Soldiers and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 575 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 92, 92-105 (2001).
4Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263, art. 1(May 25, 2005)
("States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces
who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities."), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfbl80.html.
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marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has
carried arms. 45
Ten years later, the 2007 Paris Principles shifted to the term "child
associated with an armed forces or armed group," which was defined as any
person below eighteen years of age who is or who has been recruited or used
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to
children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or
for sexual purposes." 46
As the commentary to AP II aptly summarized "[t]he moment at which a
person ceases to be a child and becomes an adult is not judged in the same way
everywhere in the world. Depending on the culture, the age may vary between
about fifteen and eighteen years." 47 While the Rome Statute's use of fifteen
years as the child soldier threshold is seemingly unambiguous, determining age
of child soldiers is anything but.
B. Age of the Child Soldiers in the UPC/FPLC
It was tragically self-evident that children serving in the UPC/FPLC at the
time. Witnesses testified about how the child soldiers would play childhood
games, and about how the female child soldiers would braid grass "as if they
[were] braiding the hair of a doll." 48 In fact, the lack of adult attitudes and
demands were some of the perceived advantages of using child soldiers. They
were not very demanding, they were not asking for money to buy what they
wanted, they didn't have a girlfriend, they couldn't drink, whereas older young
soldiers had other troubles as well. A child-as long as he can wash and eat,
that's all he needs, while adults, elder soldiers, want more than that.49
Determining the age of the child soldiers in the UPC/FPLC proved
challenging for the court. The court explained that "[g]iven the undoubted
differences in personal perception as regards estimates of age and, most
particularly in the context of this case, the difficulties in distinguishing between
young people who are relatively close to the age of fifteen (whether above or
below), the Chamber has exercised caution when considering this evidence.,"50
45 UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (Feb. 1997),
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/CapeTownPrinciples(1).pdf.
46 UNICEF, The Paris Principles, Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed
Forces and Armed Groups, ] 2.1 (Feb. 2007),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/465198442.html (stating that while a number of
countries have signed the Paris Principles, the signatories include some of the worst child
soldier offenders, Sudan, Chad, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo).
4AP II, suprca note 44, at cmt. 4549.
4Lubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, at ] 807.
49 Id. at ] 845.
so Id. at ] 643.
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The court considered witnesses from international and non-governmental
organizations, both prosecution and defense witnesses, and also video
evidence.5'
While agreeing with the defense that it is difficult to distinguish between a
twelve or thirteen-year-old and a fifteen or sixteen-year-old, the court found
that photographic and video extracts depicted children "who are clearly under
the age of 15.';52 Even a defense witness affirmatively declined to testify that
the UPC did not utilize child soldiers, stating "one can't exclude that some
might have got through the net. When you go fishing, you can have a certain
net and some fish can get through ....'nss Ultimately, the trial chamber held that
even allowing for a wide margin of error in assessing an individual's age, ...it is
feasible for non-expert witnesses to differentiate between a child who is
undoubtedly less than 15 years old and a child who is undoubtedly over 15.
Furthermore, the sheer volume of credible evidence relating to the presence of
children below the age of 15 within the ranks of the UPC/FPLC has
demonstrated conclusively that a significant number were part of the UPC/FPLC
army. 54
C. Activities Lubanga's Child Soldiers Performed
Having established that Lubanga and the UPC/FPLC utilized children under
the age of the fifteen, willing and unwilling, the next inquiry is whether the
activities the children performed constituted active participation in hostilities.
The trial chamber found that Lubanga recruited and utilized child soldiers as
young as eight-years-old55 for a variety of functions56 including fighting in
battles, serving as bodyguards,57 military guards,58 escorting high ranking
UPC/FPLC officials59 and performing domestic work.60  Under Lubanga's
leadership, the UPC/FPLC even formed a specific unit of small children, or
51 Id. at ] 643. The evidence included logbooks from demobilization centers and logbooks,
correspondence and reports from the UPC/FPLC. Id. at ] 733, 741, 749, and 753.
52 Id. at ] 644. The defense claimed it was "impossible to reliably distinguish " between
children whose ages were 1-2 years on either side of the 15 year threshold.
s3 Id. at ] 768.
5 4 Id. at ] 643.
ss Id. at ] 765. The UPC recruited 8 year olds in 2000, which is prior to the Rome Statute
entering force. The youngest age of a UPC child soldier during the timeframe at issue, 2002 to
2003, was 9. Id. at ] 713.
s6 Lubanga and the UPC/FPLC's actions regarding child soldiers were, tragically, hardly unique.
Throughout the conflicts which ravaged the DRC beginning in 1996, "the use of child soldiers in
armed groups was the rule, not the exception." Id. at ] 62.
s7 Id. at ] 821.
ss8 Id. at ] 835.
s5 Id. at ] 839.
6o0 Id. at ] 878.
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"kadogos" 6 , with "slightly fewer than 45 members." 62
The international criminal culpability threshold though is whether those
functions constitute active participation in hostilities, the language from article
8 of the Rome Statute. Not surprisingly, the views of the parties in Lubanga on
this issue diverged.
D. Parties' Views on Active Participation
As the Lubanga Court noted, active participation is "not defined in the
[Rome] Statute, the Rules or the Elements of Crimes." 63 The prosecution and
the legal representative for the victims adopted the meaning used by the pre-
trial chamber in Lubanga that "active participation in hostilities means not only
direct participation in hostilities but covers active participation in combat
related activities such as scouting, spying, sabotage, and the use of children as
decoys, couriers or at military check points." 64
The defense argued that active participation in hostilities equates to "acts
of war, which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the
personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."65  Not unreasonably,
the court looked to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the first
international tribunal to consider child soldier offenses. 6 In terms of child
67soldier offenses, the statute for the SCSL is identical to the Rome Statute. In
mapping the contours of active participation in hostilities, the SCSL noted that
an armed force requires logistical support to maintain its operations. Any labor
or support that gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict
constitutes active participation. Hence carrying loads for the fighting faction,
finding and/or acquiring food, ammunition or equipment, acting as decoys,
6As one prosecution witness testified, "in the UPC and Ugandan armies, indeed in Africa
generally, small children from about the age of 13 up to the age of 16 are called kadogos" Id. at
] 636.
62 Id. at ] 871.
63Id. at ] 600.
64Id. at ] 591 (referring to confirmation of charges para 261). One difference between the
views of the prosecutor and the victims representative was on whether active participation
included girls recruited into the armed forces for sexual purposes. The victims representative
argued it did, an argument the prosecutor did not make, and, as a result, one the court did not
address. Id. at ] 598.
65 Id. at ] 584.
See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, (June 20,
2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/467fba742.pdf [hereinafter Brima Judgment].
See UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 4(c) (Jan. 16, 2002),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,NTINSTRUM ENT,,, 3dda29f94,0.html (listing
"conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 into the armed forces or groups or using
them to participate actively in hostilities" as a serious violation of international humanitarian
law).
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carrying messages, making trails or finding routes, manning checkpoints or
acting as human shields are some examples of active participation as much as
actual fighting and combat.68
The SCSL held that active participation is "not restricted to children directly
involved in combat" 69 but "encompasses the use of children in functions other
than as front line troops [] including support roles within military operations." 70
But to constitute active participation, the support roles would need to put the
child soldiers' lives "directly at risk in combat."7
The pretrial chamber in Lubanga elaborated, explaining that activities like
serving as a bodyguard would need "to have a direct impact on the level of
logistic resources and on the organization of operations required by the other
party to the conflict". 72 Conversely, "children who were engaged in activities
'clearly unrelated to hostilities'... do not actively participate in hostilities." 73
Both the pretrial and trial chambers in Lubanga rely on a draft version of the
Rome Statute, which, in a footnote stated that the words "using" and
"participate" have been adopted in order to cover both direct participation in
combat and also active participation in military activities linked to combat such
as scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at
military checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to the
hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an
officer's married accommodation. However, use of children in a direct support
function such as acting as bearers to take supplies to the front line, or activities
at the front line itself, would be included within the terminology. 74
Both chambers' reliance is misplaced-in distinguishing between direct and
active participation the footnote misstates the law. The Lubanga Court, in
misapplying the misstatement, compounds the error. The result, while
expanding the scope of Lubanga's liability, decreased the scope of protection
from attack international humanitarian law would otherwise afford to child
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 624 (quoting Brima Judgment, supra note 68, at ]
737). The Lubanga Court's analysis is largely based on, and follows, that of the SCSL. That the
SCSL broadly defined active participation is also problematic and for the same reasons. But at
least the SCSL issued its decisions before the ICRC issued the interpretative guidance on direct
participation in hostilities. The ICC however issued the Lubanga decision over 3 years after the
ICC published the interpretative guidance.
Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 624 (referring to Brima Judgment, supra note 68).
70 Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, at ] 625.
71.IISLubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, at 626 (quoting Brim a Judgment, suprca note 68, at
736).
7Lubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, at ] 624.
I3d. at ] 623 (quoting Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29 2007) at 1] 262).
7Lubanga Judgment, suprai note 2, at ] 621.
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soldiers like those in the UPC/FPLC. Those protections are qualified by how the
term civilian is defined and whether their actions amount to direct participation
in hostilities.
IV. CIVILIANS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
It is axiomatic that the law of armed conflict protects civilians from being
the object of direct attack or "targeted." 75 At first blush, child soldiers in the
UPC/FPLC may not seem the "civilians" the law envisioned. But nowhere in the
law of armed conflict is the term civilian positively defined. Despite the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention's focus on the protection of civilian persons in time
of war, it doesn't define who exactly is-and isn't-a civilian.76  Additional
Protocol I does define the term civilian, but does so negatively in article 50. It
states that "[a] civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A(1); (2), (3) and (6) of the Third
Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of [Additional Protocol]." 77 The definition
concludes with "[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person
shall be considered to be a civilian."78
The references to Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, and to article
43 of AP I, are to persons who qualify for status as a prisoner of war. This
includes:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of
militia or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces;
7s Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions codifies the basic protections the law
of armed conflict affords civilians from the application of force. These include that: "[t]he
civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising
from military operations....The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall
not be the object of attack. Acts of threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."
AP I, supra note 42, art. 51.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 76 U.N.T.S. 287.
AP I, supra note 42, art. 50. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its
commentary to article 50, further explains that this definition has the great advantage of being
"ne varietur." Its negative character is justified by the fact the concepts of the civilian
population and the armed forces are only conceived in opposition to each other, that the later
constitutes a category of persons which is now clearly defined in international law and
determined in an indisputably manner by the laws and regulations of States. Therefore it was
worth taking advantage of this possibility. It is clear that a negative definition of the civilian
population implies that the meaning given to "armed forced" must be pointed out. ICRC
Commentary to AP I, supra note 42, art. 50, sec. 1914.
7AP I, suprca note 42, art. 50 (1). See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-T, Judgment, 11 180
(Mar. 3 2000) (defining civilians as "persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed
forces.").
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(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory;
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government of
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time
to form themselves into regular armed units.79
The UPC/FPLC does not fit in any of the categories.80 Thus under the law of
armed conflict's negative definition, its members, child or adult, are considered
civilians. Having articulated, albeit indirectly, the definition of civilian, article 50
then qualifies the protections the law of armed conflict affords this class of
individuals. "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section [of not
being the target of the application of force] unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities."8 '
The meaning and temporal limitations of the direct participation in
hostilities qualification to the norm that civilians may not be targeted are
among the most contentious areas of the law of armed conflict. But rather
than add clarity to what does and does not constitute direct participation in
hostilities, the Lubunga decision further muddled the field, further increasing
the risk to child soldiers in the process.
A. Active vs. Direct Participation
Simply put, the Lubanga Court separates active from direct participation,
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 4, Aug. 12 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. This obviously skips over
two categories, (4) and (5). Four is "persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such a civilian members of military aircraft crews, war
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible for the
welfare of the armed forces...." Five is "members of crews, including masters, pilots and
apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict,
who do not benefit from by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of
international law." Id. art. 4. Since these two categories are excepted from AP I's negative
definition of civilian, these individuals are considered civilians. Finally, reference to art. 43 of
AP I is to "the armed forces of a Party to a conflict....", which would qualify such individuals as
prisoners of war and thus not as civilians. AP I, supra note 42, Art. 43.
so To qualify for prisoner of war status, and the attendant combatant immunity, the UPC/FPLC
would also to fulfill the following conditions of Article 4(2): (a) that of being commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Third Geneva Convention, suprca note 81, art. 4(2). At a minimum, the UPC/FPLC did not follow
the laws of armed conflict and thus does not qualify.
sAP I, suprai note 42, Art. 51(3).
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but the law recognizes no such distinction. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), in its Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, stated that
although the English texts of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
use the words "active" and "direct", respectively, the consistent use of the
phrase "participent directement" in the equally authentic French texts
demonstrate that the terms "direct" and "active" refer to the same quality and
degree of individual participation in hostilities.82
Flowing from, or perhaps causing, the flawed attempt to disaggregate
participation in hostilities, the Lubanga Court overstates the differences in the
legal regimes applicable to international vs non-international conflict.
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which governs international
armed conflict, uses the term "participate directly". Additional Protocol Ito
the Geneva Conventions, which governs non-international armed conflicts,
utilizes "to participate actively." 84 The Lubanga Court claimed that [t]he use of
the expression "to participate actively in hostilities", as opposed to the
expression "direct participation" (as found in Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions) was clearly intended to import a wide interpretation to
the activities and roles that are covered by the offence of using children under
the age of 15 actively to participate in hostilities.85
In attempting to explain a distinction that doesn't exist, the Court blithely
noted that the participation in hostilities language of AP II "does not include the
word "direct"." That superficial analysis is literally true-but substantively
false. The ICRC, in explaining the absence of the very distinction the Lubanga
Court relied on, stated that "taking a direct part in hostilities is used
synonymously in the Additional Protocols I and II, it should be interpreted in the
same manner in international and non-international armed conflict."86
Applying its flawed conception of direct vs active participation, the Lubanga
Court concluded that those who participate actively in hostilities include a wide
range of individuals, from those on the front line (who participate directly)
through to the boys or girls who are involved in a myriad of roles that support
the combatants. All of these activities, which cover either direct or indirect
82 Nils Melzer, Int'l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Law, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 991, 1013-14
(2009) (adopted by the assembly of the international committee of the Red Cross on February
26, 2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidelines].
AP I, supra note 42, art. 43(2).
84 AP II, supra note 44, art. (3)(c).
8s Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, 11 627.
CRC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 83, at 1014 (emphasis added). Moreover, that view
is not just that of the ICRC but was the prevailing view of the legal experts who worked with
the ICRC in developing the Interpretative Guidance.
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participation, have an underlying common feature: the child concerned is, at
the very least, a potential target. Having failed to recognize that active and
direct refer to the same level of participation, the court reaches the oxymoronic
position of determining when indirect participation constitutes active
participation. Essentially, the court is asking when indirect participation
constitutes direct participation. It does not, it cannot.
The test the court develops for this inherently contradictory inquiry is that
"[t]he decisive factor, therefore, in deciding if an "indirect" role is to be treated
as active participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child
to the combatants exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target."88
Not explaining the meaning of any of the substantive portions of this "decisive
factor,"89 the Court then expanded, without defining, the temporal nexus
holding that In the judgment of the Chamber these combined factors-the
child's support and this level of consequential risk-mean that although absent
from the immediate scene of the hostilities, the individual was nonetheless
actively involved in them." 90
V.THE LUBANGA DECISION's RISK TO CHILD SOLDIERS
The harm the Lubanga decision poses to child soldiers flows from
attempting to distinguish active from direct participation in hostilities and then
broadly defining what constitutes active participation. The result is an
increased range of activities constituting direct participation. This renders child
soldiers performing the actions targetable in the process.
Child soldiers who carry weapons and fight are directly participating and
thus targetable. But as previously discussed, most child soldiers do not carry or
use weapons, they provide a range of logistics or support functions. These
functions constitute the almost limitless expansion of harm the Lubanga
decision created for child soldiers.
In creating a space between direct and active participation, the court
claimed that "[t]he travauxpreparatoires of the [Rome] Statute suggests that
although direct participation is not necessary, a link with combat is nonetheless
required." 9' But as the ICRC observed, "[s]tandards such as "indirect causation
of harm" are clearly too wide, as they would bring the entire war effort within
the concept of direct participation in hostilities and, thus, would deprive large
Lubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, 628.
I8d. 2]628.
For example, the words "expose", "potential" and "target" all warrant definition. And the
use of "real danger" is particularly unhelpful. As opposed to what kind of danger?
90 Id.
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parts of the civilian population of their protection against direct attack." 92 The
ICC's test for indirect active participation, whether the child soldier's activities
exposed him or her to "real danger," is equally problematic. Under this test,
unarmed child soldier activities related to hostilities, which have a direct impact
on logistic resources constitute active participation. Finding, carrying, and
providing food for example, could all qualify.
By way of comparison, the ICRC concluded that there are three constitutive
elements to direct participation in hostilities:
(1) The harm likely to result from the act must attain a certain threshold;
(2) There must be a direct casual link between the act and the harm likely to
result;
(3) The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment
of another.93
These elements exclude conduct (and thus preclude targeting) which the
Lubanga Court would include. Returning to logistics resources, the ICRC
recognized that providing food to the armed forces is "indispensable." 94  But
providing food is not directly casual to the infliction of harm and as a result
does not constitute DPH. 95
Even the Lubanga Court's limits on active participation are problematic. The
court mentions that "food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff
in married officer's quarters" do not constitute active participation. 96  The
qualifications on the limitations are troubling. It is not that food deliveries per
se do not qualify, but that food deliveries to an airbase do not. 97  The
implication is that food delivery to the front line of hostilities might, as the
unarmed child doing so would exposed to risk. Similarly, the court could have
but did not say domestic work per se does not amount to active participation.
Similar to food delivery, the court qualified the limitation, here to married
officer's quarters. One can envision child soldiers performing domestic work
closer to the scene of hostilities than married officer's spouses and quarters
would be located. Again, under the Lubanga decision, where the domestic
work exposed the child to "real danger", the work presumably qualifies as
92 ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 83.
Id. The defense in Lubanga argued for the court to use the three factors and a narrow
definition of participation. Lubanga Judgment, supra note 2, ] 585.
ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 83.
es Id.
Lubanga Judgment, suprca note 2, ] 623.
The airbase reference is itself odd as the organized armed groups, which employ child
soldiers, do not posses air power. An example with a never occurring predicate is not
particularly illuminating.
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active participation. This expansive view of participation may prove more
retributive than protective of child soldiers.
To maintain balance between the mutual aspects of participation, the court
should limit active participation to those activities that constitute DPH under
the ICRC's interpretative guidance. This would also eliminate what is an
otherwise glaring and problematic discrepancy between how the ICRC and the
ICC define participation in hostilities. To ensure that the use of child soldiers in
all its forms is criminalized, the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute
could modify the statute to include indirect participation. 98
Any retributive legacy from the Lubanga case probably will not directly arise
in the child soldier context. Rather a defendant before the ICC or other
international tribunal who is charged with wrongful killing may utilize the
Lubanga Court's analysis in a way neither the prosecutor nor the court probably
ever envisioned and certainly never intended. The defendant will argue that
the victims' logistic or support roles constitute direct participation in hostilities
and thus targeting them was permissible under the law of armed conflict.99
While such an argument may well fall short, international criminal justice
deserved to be able to rely on and not have to distinguish if not disavow the
ICC's first case.
VI.CONCLUSION
In Lubanga, the prosecutor argued for a broader definition of participation in
hostilities "in order to afford wider protection to child soldiers."' 00  The
attendant methodological compromises and contradictions increased one
defendant's liability, but eroded that very protection in the process.
The statute could incorporate the Lubanga court's point about risk to the child soldier in
differing penalties for direct and indirect participation in hostilities.
Such a defendant could argue that the victims' deaths per se prove the other component of
the test the Lubaingai Court developed-that they were in real danger.
00Lubanga Judgment, suprai note 2, 11 578.
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